It is sometimes claimed that non-human animals (and perhaps also young children) live their lives entirely in the present and are cognitively 'stuck in time'. Adult humans, by contrast, are said to be able to engage in 'mental time travel'. One possible way of making sense of this distinction is in terms of the idea that animals and young children cannot engage in tensed thought, which might seem a preposterous idea in the light of certain findings in comparative and developmental psychology. I try to make this idea less preposterous by looking into some of the cognitive requirements for tensed thought. In particular, I suggest that tensed thought requires a specific form of causal understanding, which animals and young children may not possess.
Introduction
Is the mental life of (at least some) non-human animals fundamentally quite similar to our own, or is the relationship between human beings and the rest of the animal kingdom marked by some deep discontinuity? Amongst those who have held the latter view, two, on the face of it quite different, approaches stand out. Many writers have taken language to be the key feature that sets humans off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and have appealed to animals' lack of language to both explain and make good the claim that their minds are radically unlike our own.
1 However, there is
The only thing missing is evidence that they have human-like conscious recollections of their worm and nut caching activities. They may just 'know' what kind of food is where, and what state it is in -fresh or rotten -without knowing how or why they know it. (Tulving 2001 (Tulving , p. 1512 .
I take it that this is Tulving's way of putting the point that, despite Clayton & Dickinson's findings, scrub jays might nevertheless be incapable of mental time travel, and that their cognitive abilities thus fall short of our own in quite a fundamental respect. Similar views have been expressed in a series of papers by Thomas Suddendorf (e.g., Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997 . At the same time, there have also been rejoinders from Clayton and her colleagues (Clayton et al., 2003) , and from other comparative psychologists who have claimed to have demonstrated mental time travel in animals, questioning the empirical tractability of the claims made by Tulving and Suddendorf (see, e.g., Eichenbaum et al., 2005) .
I think it is worth bringing out, though, that, even in the short passage I have quoted from Tulving (2001) , there actually seem to be at least three quite different ideas at work as to what the crucial difference between humans and other animals that is at issue might come to.
(1) One distinction Tulving alludes to, which has emerged from the literature on adult memory, is that between remembering (or, as he puts it here, "conscious recollection"), on the one hand, and knowing, on the other. The basic thought here goes back to the idea of a distinction between two different kinds of memory, for which Tulving (1972) originally coined the terms 'episodic memory' and 'semantic memory'. As it is usually understood, the remembering/knowing distinction is meant to indicate that episodic recall of particular past events, i.e. the type of remembering that constitutes mental time travel into the past, involves a specific kind of conscious experience, typically called recollective experience. By contrast, such recollective experience is absent when retrieval is merely a matter of calling up previously acquired knowledge from semantic memory. It is thought that this difference can be tapped into empirically in studies in which participants are asked questions about a number of previously presented items and are instructed, in each case, to classify their responses as ones that are based on 'remembering' the item, on the one hand, or just 'knowing' that the item was there, on the other. Adult participants in such studies can readily make sense of this instruction, and their responses can be selectively influenced by a number of task variables at encoding or retrieval.
(2) Another, potentially quite separate, issue that Tulving alludes to is whether the scrub jays studied by Clayton and her colleagues just know, say, 124 hours after caching, that there is no point going back to the side of the tray where the worms have been cached, or whether, in addition, they can also be said to know how or why they know this. Thus, the implied idea here would be that mental time travel involves some form of metacognition or self-conscious reflection, i.e. a capacity to reflect on one's past experiences as the source of one's present knowledge, or more generally to appreciate relationships between one's own mental states at different times. This idea is particularly prominent in Suddendorf's way of framing the question as to whether or not animals are capable of mental time travel (cf. Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997 ; see also Perner, 2007) .
Perhaps unsurprisingly, though, some animal researchers and developmentalists have found neither of the above two ways of drawing a distinction between those capable and those incapable of mental time travel very helpful (see, e.g., Clayton et al., 2003; McCormack & Hoerl, 2001 ). It is difficult to see, for instance, how to construct a non-verbal measure that might be deemed equivalent to the type of task used to explore the remembering/knowing distinction in adults.
Similarly, we might grant that the ability to recollect the past seems to play a crucial role in allowing us to grasp the sources of some of our knowledge -how or why we know what we do 4 -but it is at least not obvious why the ability to recollect the past should itself, in turn, depend on such metacognitive abilities.
At any rate, it is easy to get a sense that the basic issue that Nietzsche had in mind when he wrote that animals are "fettered to the present" gets somewhat lost
here. Of course, one response to this might be that this is not very surprisingperhaps the kind of intuition articulated by Nietzsche is just too crude and can easily be shown to be false by studies such as Clayton & Dickinson's. I want to suggest, though, that that would be the wrong response.
(3) In addition to the two distinctions I have already mentioned, there is a third one that is at least hinted at in the above quotation from Tulving, which I would like to look at in more detail. Even though there are other passages in which Tulving seems to agree with Clayton & Dickinson (1998) Smith describe here is the real source of the intuition that animals are stuck in time.
However, I also think that Smith slightly mis-characterizes the key issue at stake.
Where Smith says that the undercutting explanation ascribes to the dog a presenttense belief acquired in the past, rather than a past-tense belief together with a general belief, I think we should say that, on the undercutting explanation, there is a sense in which the dog's belief lacks tense altogether. Arguably, saying that the dog employs a present-tense belief still suggests that the dog operates with a distinction between how things are now and how they are at other times. 7 What Bennett and Smith's undercutting strategy seems to give us, instead, is a way of making sense of the dog's behaviour without appealing to any notion of other times at all.
The key general move in the undercutting strategy as described by Smith, I believe, is to show how an explanation of a given set of behaviours over time might be available on the level of facts about beliefs, and about the conditions that determine their persistence, rather than on the level of how (if at all) time itself is represented in those beliefs. 8 Once the issue at stake has been put in those terms, 6 I am simplifying the dialectical situation here. Bennett (1976) , from which the first quotation in this paragraph is taken, actually goes on to criticise the argument from Bennett (1964) that I have sketched.
He suggests that non-linguistic behaviour might, after all, warrant the ascription of separate past and general beliefs, if there is a range of different behaviours the animal engages in that can be explained by attributing a past belief that combines with a number of different general beliefs or vice versa. Smith's (1982) paper, from which the second quotation is taken, considers this suggestion and argues that it underestimates the strength of Bennett's (1964) argument, i.e. the undercutting strategy can be made to work even in cases where there is a range of behaviours as envisaged by Bennett (1976) . For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that Smith's defense of Bennett's (1964) argument is sound. 7 See also the discussion of Campbell's (2006) views below.
however, it should also be clear that the example used by Bennett and Smith is in fact only one example on a much wider spectrum.
Consider again, for instance, Clayton & Dickinson's (1998) is plausible to think that the jays' behaviour is governed by some sort of interval timer that is entrained during the learning trials in which the birds find out that the worms decay within 124 hours. The idea of such a timer, an internal mechanism that is sensitive to the time that has elapsed since a certain stimulus, has been used to explain performance of both animals and humans on a variety of timing tasks, and there are a number of different theoretical models of how such timers might operate (see Wearden, 2001 , for a review). For present purposes, the basic idea is that, in There is scope for further discussion of the details of McCormack's challenge and how exactly it needs to be spelled out to apply to Griffiths et al.'s findings (see de Kort et al., 2005, pp. 169f.) . The basic point I want to bring out is that this challenge can actually be seen as a version of Bennett and Smith's undercutting strategy. The critical point is that the function of the interval timer might simply be to determine how long the jays retain the belief that there are worms in a certain location, so that, after a certain period of time has elapsed, it simply no longer occurs to them to search the side of the tray where the worms were cached.
9
In the background of both Bennett and Smith's as well as McCormack's arguments, there seems to be a more general picture of animal cognition, which might be summarized as follows. At any one time, the animal simply entertains a model of how the world is or might be. Whilst the ingredients of that model have been acquired in the past, they are of significance to the animal only in as far as they can inform its actions or expectations. Over time, elements of the model can change either because they get superseded by new information, or because their persistence is governed by a timing mechanism. 10 Either way, the result is simply that of the model being updated.
Previous information that is no longer relevant to action or expectation is simply discarded, rather than being retained, say, in the form of past-tensed beliefs.
The key idea here is thus that of a fundamental distinction between two different ways in which cognition can be sensitive to the passing of time, which we might call mere updating vs. tensed thought. At the end of the previous section, I
suggested that the idea that animals, and possibly also young children, are unable to engage in tensed thought might provide one way of giving content to the claim that they are stuck in time. My aim in this section was to show just how, at least in the case of animals, ascriptions of tensed thoughts might be challenged using a particular sort of undercutting strategy. What is revealed by this strategy is precisely how certain forms of behaviour might equally well be explained by the idea of the animal operating with a model of its environment that is maintained and updated in various ways as time goes by, but in which each update simply replaces its predecessor without making room for the idea of other times, as times at which things were (or will be) different from how that update has it.
10 There are also cases in which it might be more appropriate to say that the function of the timing mechanism is to suppress certain elements of the model for periods of time. This type of description might be applied, for instance, to capture the role interval timers have in preventing hummingbirds from revisiting a food source for a certain period of time, thus allowing the food source to replenish (cf. Henderson et al., 2006) . I should also add, here, that we need to allow that the model an animal operates with might be fairly disunified, or, as we might also put it, that an animal might be seen to operate with several different models, which are updated in different ways and on different timescales, relative to different sets of practical purposes. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to this latter point.
A natural first response to what I have said so far is that I must have misunderstood the issues at stake in the existing debate over mental time travel in animals and
humans that writers such as Tulving (2001) and Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) are engaged in; I have simply changed the topic. In particular, the existing debate is concerned with mental time travel as a particular form of exercise of the imagination, or at least something akin to it, and it is at least not obvious that having beliefs about the past requires such an imaginative ability. It is frequently pointed out by authors such as Tulving that much human thinking about the past and the future does not involve mental time travel at all, for instance when we recall the date of the battle of Hastings.
Furthermore, the response might continue, it is simply preposterous to suggest that animals can't form beliefs about the past, and even more so for the case of young children. There is a wide variety of research that might be seen to provide evidence against this suggestion by showing that animals are capable of learning to perform not just individual actions, but ordered sequences of actions. Similarly, it has been shown that even quite young children are capable of retaining knowledge about familiar sequences of events -such as going to a fast-food restaurant, or visiting the doctorin the form of scripts. On the face of it, learning about the correct order of events in a sequence requires an ability to keep track of the elements of the sequence that have already been performed and the ones that are still to come. There needs to be some sensitivity to temporal facts in place if an animal is to carry off the sequence or a child is to recount a script in the right order. Thus, it may again seem that the issues I have been talking about can't be the same issues that are at stake in the existing literature on mental time travel, where it is usually assumed that it is a live option that animals and young children are incapable of mental time travel, even though they can learn about sequences.
We can put both of these points into focus by looking at a view recently put forward by John Campbell (2006) , which contrasts with the view I have sketched. On
Campbell's picture, animals and young children do have a rudimentary notion of the past and the future, but the key difference between them and us consists in the fact that their temporal horizon is, so to speak, much smaller than ours. Thus, for instance, a child recounting a fast-food restaurant or a going-to-the-doctor script might be able to grasp temporal relationships between the different elements within each script, but might be at a loss when it comes to understanding the question as to which of two things she did more recently: go to the doctor or eat at a fast-food restaurant. The way in which Campbell expresses this idea is as follows. He says we should credit the child with tensed notions -for instance a notion of 'now', which is governed by the general token-reflexive rule for 'now' that any token of it refers to the time at which it is produced. Yet, he also holds that there is a difference in meaning between the child's 'now' and 'now' as understood by an adult, because the underlying domain of times is different (and similarly for other tensed notions the child employs).
The domain of times over which this [token-reflexive] rule is defined will not, of course, be times drawn from our ordinary range of linearly organised times; they will themselves be times defined in terms of the temporal framework provided by the script. Within each script times are temporally related; but we cannot express temporal relations between times identified in different scripts. (Campbell, 2006, p. 6) Is there an alternative to the kind of view that Campbell puts forward? Here, too, it seems that one alternative to postulating a grasp of tenses, even one that is fairly primitive when compared with a mature grasp of tenses, is to make use of a distinction between tensed thought and a more simple type of sensitivity to temporal relations that involves only the updating of a model.
Note, first of all, that it is possible to mount an argument against Campbell's view that mirrors, at least to some extent, Bennett's argument as presented in the previous section. As in Bennett's argument, we start with a specific sort of behaviour over time as our explanandum. What needs to be explained, in this case, is what enables a child correctly to recount or re-enact, say, a sequence of three events, A, B and C. Campbell's view, in effect, offers an explanans that comes in two parts. It implies that we must credit the child both with an ability to think of the order in which A, B and C are arranged, and with the ability to orient herself within this order using Yet, this seems to be an obvious point at which to bring in an appeal to imagination. Perhaps there is a primitive way of acquiring scripts for familiar sequences of events that doesn't involve the use of tenses, as I have suggested. But perhaps Campbell is also right that we can credit children and animals with a grasp of tenses, if, in addition to using their knowledge of scripts for recounting or re-enacting familiar sequences, they can also use it to imagine, say, what will be the case in a little while, at a later stage in the sequence that is currently unfolding, or imaginatively undo stages in the sequence that have already happened.
11 A similar thought is fleshed out further in McCormack & Hoerl (1999) , who relate research on children's acquisition of scripts to a view in linguistics according to which aspectual notions (e.g., completed, ongoing…) are grasped before tensed ones (e.g., past, present…) (see Wagner, 2001 , for a recent discussion). McCormack & Hoerl (1999) suggest that children's recounting or re-enacting scripts might indicate an ability to mark events successively as, e.g., ongoing vs. completed, as they go through the script. This ability appears to be more primitive than a grasp of tenses, though, in that it need not involve use of the notion of the time at which an event happens. A child might first think of an event as ongoing, and then as completed, without being able to grasp, say, at the time when she thinks of the event as completed, that there was a time when it was ongoing. In contrast, thinking of an event as past, say, arguably involves assigning it a position in a domain of times, as is also brought out by the quotation from Campbell (2006) above.
I think this suggestion encounters a problem, though, as soon as we try to spell out in more detail exactly how imagination is meant to come in here. To illustrate, consider a person who is having dinner in a busy restaurant. They have just ordered and are waiting for their starter. While doing so, they look at the neighbouring table, at a group that arrived earlier and are already tucking into their dessert. I think we can distinguish between two slightly different types of imaginative project our protagonist might engage in at this point: (i) they might imagine having already finished their starter and main course, and eating their dessert, just like the group at the neighbouring table; or (ii) they might imaginatively advance time and think of the situation that will actually obtain in the future when they will get to their dessert themselves. 12 One way of describing the difference between (i) and (ii) is that, in (i), our protagonist imagines a counterfactual state of affairs as actual, whereas, in (ii), they imagine a state of affairs that is actually yet to come as ongoing. 13 On the face of it, it is only the second type of imaginative exercise that involves mental time travel; the first might simply be described as involving travelling between different possible worlds. The problem is that, in order to distinguish between (i) and (ii) in the first place, it seems that we already have to appeal to a grasp of tenses, on the part of our protagonist, and to the idea that, in the case of (ii), the imaginative project that they are engaged in is itself formulated in terms of the future tense. Thus, I think we can accept that mental time travel consists in or involves a particular form of exercise of 12 Both types of imagination mentioned here might require the ability to set aside current desires or other mental states in imagination. The development of this ability is explored in experiments carried out, e.g. by Atance & Meltzoff (2006) and by Suddendorf & Busby (2005) , which claim to investigate the development of mental time travelling in children. However, precisely because that ability might be required for either form of imaginative exercise mentioned above, it should be clear that there is a further aspect of mental time travel that those experiments don't tap into. 13 A similar distinction is sometimes drawn in the literature on the development of counterfactual reasoning. It has been argued that some developmental studies might have over-estimated children's command of counterfactuals, because the correct answer to the counterfactual test question could be arrived at by engaging in purely hypothetical reasoning, whereas children of a similar age fail counterfactual tasks that require 'thinking back in time' and considering the particular events that actually happened. See Beck et al. (2006) for discussion.
the imagination, or at least something akin to it. Yet, the ability to engage in the right kind of imaginative exercise that's at issue already presupposes a grasp of tenses; it cannot be what explains such a grasp.
However, I believe that the issue I have just sketched might also give us a hint as to the sort of explanation we need to look for if we want to account for the ability to engage in mental time travel. The key question it raises is how children might give substance to the distinction between events that are not part of the present scene because they're merely possible, not actual, and events that are not part of the present scene because they belong to the future (or the past). 14 I think at least some of the ingredients for an answer to this question can be found in some recent work in comparative and developmental psychology, which I will discuss in the next, final, section of this paper.
Tensed Thought and Causal Understanding
In the first section of this paper, I mentioned (and expressed some sympathy with) a common criticism that psychologists have levelled at the way in which the notion of mental time travel has been fleshed by authors such as Tulving (2001) and Corballis (1997, 2007 have suggested that we should think of the crucial question at issue in the claim that animals and young children are stuck in time (i.e., incapable of mental time travel) as that as to whether we can credit them with tensed thought at all. Yet, because we are familiar with tense primarily as a feature of sentences, it may be thought that the account I have offered is ultimately vulnerable to the same criticism as those other writers' accounts, in that it might seem that the only conclusive way in which tensed thought can be manifested is by engaging in tensed talk. I think such a reaction misconstrues the account I have offered, though, and I will try to show in this final section how some existing empirical work might actually be seen to tie in with my account.
Thomas Zentall (2005 Zentall ( , 2006 already been exposed to, so that timing or sequential learning mechanisms can become entrained to them. Thus, for instance, a child's becoming familiar with certain sequences of events and learning a script for them might simply be a matter of the child learning to perform or think of certain events in a certain temporal order, i.e. do or think of, first A, then B, and then C. Crucially, though, if a child were to demonstrate that she can also reason about event sequences for which she does not yet have a script because she has not actually encountered them before, the above type of explanation could not be applied.
The key question we should therefore ask is: What are circumstances in which children do have to think about event sequences that they have not encountered before, and about the order of events in those sequences? I think a very good example can be found in studies recently carried out be Cristina Atance (2006) . One of the tasks she gave children was to put on an ant costume that consisted of two parts -an ant body and an ant head with large antennae. Crucially, the two parts of the costume have to be put on in a specific order, because if you put the head on first, the body part won't fit over the antennae. Intuitively, it is unlikely that children can recruit an already existing script to solve this task. Rather, it seems that they have to work out the order in which to put on the two parts of the costume.
What does it take to work out the order in which the two parts of the costume have to be put on? Clearly, part of the issue here is that children need to recognize certain spatial facts, such as that the ant head is bigger than the opening at the top of the body. But the kind of reasoning required here is also concerned with a particular sort of causal relationship, namely one in which a particular outcome is dependent on a sequence of events, performed in the right order. The desired effect -wearing the ant costume -is dependent not just on carrying out the two actions of putting on the body and putting on the head, but on putting on the body before the head. I want to suggest that a grasp of these sorts of causal relationships might play quite a basic role in the emergence of the ability to engage in mental time travel. there is also a more specific role that the particular type of causal relationship at issue in Atance's experiment plays in making intelligible just how causality and time are connected here. 15 As I said, the causal relationship here is one where a particular outcome is dependent on a sequence of events, performed in the right order. As such, grasping it involves not just the ability to think about (or imagine) first putting on the body and then putting on the head, but also the child's seeing how her wearing the ant-costume depends on events actually happening in that order rather than any other.
It is a grasp of this type of constraint, I think, which allows the child herself to give substance to the thought of the events she is thinking about as themselves being arranged in a specific temporal order, rather than her just thinking of them in that order. And this, in turn, allows us to credit her, not just with an ability to imagine 15 There is in fact a range of the type of 'temporal-causal' relationships exemplified by Atance's task, in which an overall outcome depends on the order in which two or more events happen. Children's understanding of these types of relationships has also been explored, using quite different methodologies in Povinelli et al. (1999) and McCormack & Hoerl (2007) . In these studies, children under 4-5 years typically perform quite poorly, indicating a lack of a grasp of the relevant temporalcausal relationships wearing the ant costume, but with the ability to think about her wearing the ant costume as something that, even though it is not yet the case, will actually be the case in the future. between now and then in order for it to obtain. We may think that this is a very simple thought, but I think it goes to the heart of the distinction between thinking of an event as one that will (or won't) actually happen in the future, on the one hand, and merely thinking of it as possible.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have sought to explain and make plausible one way of understanding the claim that animals and young children are stuck in time and incapable of mental time travel. On this way of understanding, the claim turns on the idea that animals and young children cannot engage in tensed thought. I have contrasted the ability to engage in tensed thought specifically with a more primitive type of sensitivity to temporal relations that involves a variety of processes operating on the individual's model of the world over time, but without distinctions between how things are at different times entering into the model itself. This more primitive sensitivity, I have suggested, can explain a variety of timing and sequential learning abilities. Crucially, however, it depends on stable temporal features of the environment -how long a certain thing usually takes, or in what order certain types of events usually happenthat the individual has already been exposed to. By contrast, in the final section I introduced a task in which children had to think about, i.e. plan, a sequence of events of a type they had not already come across before. What I sought to bring out in particular was how the ability to think about such a sequence, at least in this case, depends on a grasp of a certain type of causal relationship, in which the overall outcome depends on the order in which two events happen. And I closed with a suggestion as to how a grasp of such causal relationships might be seen to play a key role in the ability to engage in tensed thought, in that it allows the subject to give substance to the distinction between the idea of a possible event, on the one hand, and the idea of an event that will (or won't) actually happen in the future.
